{"product_id":"mathematical-anti-realism-and-modal-nothingism","title":"Mathematical Anti-Realism and Modal Nothingism","description":"\u003cp\u003eThis Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it's not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there's only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press Bookshop","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":56668792521090,"sku":"9781009346016","price":18.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0475\/2031\/7597\/files\/9781009346016i.jpg?v=1779631758","url":"https:\/\/www.cambridgebookshop.co.uk\/products\/mathematical-anti-realism-and-modal-nothingism","provider":"Cambridge University Press Bookshop","version":"1.0","type":"link"}