{"product_id":"deception-and-self-deception","title":"Deception and Self-Deception","description":"\u003cp\u003eReceived theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press Bookshop","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":56668795371906,"sku":"9781009362894","price":18.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0475\/2031\/7597\/files\/9781009362894i.jpg?v=1779632106","url":"https:\/\/www.cambridgebookshop.co.uk\/products\/deception-and-self-deception","provider":"Cambridge University Press Bookshop","version":"1.0","type":"link"}